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Abstract
Advocates of scal decentralization argue that amongst other benets, it can
increase the productive e¢ ciency of delivery of government services. This paper
is one of the rst to evaluate this claim empirically by looking at the association
between expenditure decentralization and the productive e¢ ciency of government
using a data-set of Swiss cantons. We rst provide careful evidence that expenditure
decentralization is a powerful proxy for factual local autonomy. Further panel
regressions of Swiss cantons provide robust evidence that more decentralization is
associated with higher educational attainment. We also show that these gains lead
to no adverse e¤ects across education types but that male students beneted more
from educational decentralization closing, for the Swiss case, the gender education
gap. Finally, we present evidence of the importance of competence in government
and how it can reinforce the gains from decentralization.
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1. Introduction
Fiscal decentralization, the allocation of tax and spending powers to lower levels of gov-
ernment, is now an established policy objective, in many developed and developing coun-
tries. Moreover, it is actively promoted as a development strategy by organizations such
as the World Bank (Azfar et al., 2001, World Bank, 2000). The usual advantages that
are claimed for decentralization that one can nd in the literature include the following
(Azfar et al., 2001, Lockwood, 2005, Oates, 1999). First, decentralization is claimed to
improve allocative e¢ ciency, in the sense that the goods provided by governments in
localities will be better matched to the preferences of the residents of those localities.
This is sometimes known as the preference-matching argument. Second, decentralization
is argued to increase the productive e¢ ciency of delivery of government services. In this
literature, production e¢ ciency is interpreted in a wide sense, to accommodate ine¢ cien-
cies like corruption, waste, and poor governance. There is now quite a large literature on
decentralization and allocative e¢ ciency1. By contrast, the literature on decentralization
and productive ine¢ ciency is small.
The theoretical literature identies two mechanisms by which decentralization may
lead to increased productive e¢ ciency. The rst is that decentralization may give voters
increased electoral control over incumbents. For example, Seabright (1996) and Persson
and Tabellini (2000, Chapter 9), decentralization is shown, under some conditions, to
reduce the incentives for incumbents to divert rents from tax revenue, because under
decentralization, the (negative) link between such rent diversion and the probability or
re-election is stronger. Hindriks and Lockwood (2005) extend this argument to show how
decentralization may increase the equilibrium probability that corrupt incumbents are
voted out of o¢ ce (a stronger selection e¤ect in the terminology of Besley and Smart,
2004). The second mechanism is via a decrease in lobbying by interest groups, which
both distorts policy choice and increases waste of public funds. Here, a small number of
contributions by Bardhan and Mookherjee (2003), Bordignon, Colombo, and Galmarini
(2003), and Redoano (2003) emphasise that the link between decentralization and lobbying
is ambiguous. Indeed, under some conditions, there can be more lobbying and distortion of
policy choice under decentralization, conrming the belief, going back to the US Federalist
Papers in the 18th century, that local government is more susceptible to capture by
lobbies.
1See for example, Alesina and Spolare(1997), Besley and Coate (2003), Bolton and Roland (1997) and
Cremer and Palfrey (1996), Ellingsen (1998), Gilbert and Picard (1996), Lockwood (2002), Oates (1972),
Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2002), Seabright (1996), Wallis and Oates(1988).
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The existing empirical literature does not try to precisely identify either of these
mechanisms. Rather, the approach is to look at a reduced-form relationship between s-
cal decentralization and some indicator of the e¢ ciency of government. This literature is,
to our knowledge, exclusively based on cross-country data. The level of scal decentral-
ization is usually2 measured by the percentage of government expenditures made, or taxes
collected, at sub-national level, as recorded by the IMFs Government Financial Statistics.
These papers then run regressions where the dependent variable is some easily measured
and internationally comparable outcome of government activity against the preferred de-
centralization measure together with a set of controls. For example, in Khaleghian, 2003,
the outcome is immunization coverage rate in the population Treisman, 2002, used im-
munization coverage also, along with basic drug availability, youth illiteracy rates, and
the number of kilometers of paved road per resident of the country. Alternatively, some
papers use as the dependent variable some more general indicator of government e¤ective-
ness (Huther and Shah, 1998), or corruption (Mello and Barenstein, 2001, Fisman and
Gatti, 2000).
In our view, there are two main problems with this literature. First, many of these
papers rely on the IMF measure of scal decentralization which - it is widely recognised -
does not measure very accurately the true autonomy of sub-central government to choose
expenditures and set taxes3. Second, these regressions do not estimate government pro-
duction functions, because they do not control for the inputs to the output that is the
dependent variable. For example, several papers that study health outputs do not con-
trol for health expenditures, number of doctors, etc. In the absence of controls for these
inputs, these regressions can not tell us much about the e¢ ciency of government as any
observed correlation between decentralization and government output can be attributed
2Triesman (2002) is an exception here: he uses several di¤erent constitutional indicators of decen-
tralization, such as a dummy variable for a federal country, the number of di¤erent tiers of government,
etc.
3For a critique of the IMFs Government Finance Statistics. the use of these statistics as measures
of the true autonomy of local governments, see Ebel and Yimaz(2002). These statistics tend to over-
estimate the share of government expenditure and tax revenues that are under the control of sub-national
government, and they do so in a way that varies widely across countries. For example, consider a country
(e.g. Germany) where some taxes are set nationally but where the revenues are shared with sub-national
governments via a xed formula. The share of tax revenue going to sub-national government is measured
in the IMFs statistics as sub-national revenue, even though the lower level of government may have little
or no control over choice of the rate or the base. Similar problems appear on the expenditure size from
spending that is mandated by central government but implemented by lower-level governments.
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to omitted variable bias.4
To confront these criticisms, our paper uses data on scal decentralization and ed-
ucational inputs and outputs from Swiss cantons over the period 1982-2000. There are
several advantages of these data. First, there are data on the level of scal decentraliza-
tion of spending on education within each Canton, collected on a consistent basis over
Cantons and years. So, this indicator is likely to be a much better indicator of true scal
autonomy than in the cross-country case. Moreover, the spending relates to education
only, and so there is no danger of the kind of aggregation bias that arises when using the
decentralization of total expenditure as an indicator, as do the studies cited above.
As an additional check on this, we study the relationship across Cantons between the
spending measure of decentralization and various direct measures of sub-cantonal auton-
omy in educational policy, specically, which level of government has the authority to
appoint teachers and/or determine their pay level, whether the local government has the
power to set incentive pay, and whether they have some powers over the organization
of the school or curriculum. There is a strong positive correlation between the expendi-
ture measure and an index of these direct measures. Second, in contrast to the existing
literature, as well as measuring output,we can control for the inuence of inputs on
educational outputs, such as educational expenditure per pupil and class size. In our
sample the education output in a given year is the fraction of school students that obtain
the Maturité certicate that allows continuation to university.
Our main nding is that there is a robust positive relationship between scal decen-
tralization and productive e¢ ciency of public good provision in the case of education.
This is present even when canton and year e¤ects are allowed for, and when scal decen-
tralization is instrumented by urbanization. Finally we nd no empirical support that the
gains were accompanied by losses in terms of other measures of educational attainment.
We also take our investigation further by asking whether other - possibly time-
invariant - features of cantonal and local government interact with decentralization of
education to a¤ect the Maturité pass rate. We nd that a ve-year moving average of
both cantonal and local budgetary surplus (which we take to measure good governance,
following Galiani. and Schargrodsky, 2002) has a positive interaction e¤ect on the pass
rate. So, a given amount of decentralization will lead to greater e¢ ciency gains if either
cantonal or local government is competent.
4For example, if it is found that decentralization is positively related to immunization rates (as does
Khaleghian, 2003), this could simply reect the fact that decentralized countries spend more on immu-
nization, not that they can deliver this service with greater e¢ ciency.
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We also nd, that the number of local jurisdictions in a canton (which we take to
measure possible economies of scale) has a negative interaction e¤ect on decentralization.
This is consistent with theoretical predictions, centralizing expenditure on education will
have greater e¢ ciency gains - or rather, smaller losses - when the scope for economies
of scale is larger.
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 describes the context of decen-
tralization in Switzerland. Section 3 assesses the extent of local autonomy across cantons
and its relationship to expenditure decentralization. Section 4 then turns to the empirical
evidence of expenditure decentralization and educational attainment. Section 5 concludes
and discusses the results.
2. Decentralization in Switzerland
Let us now turn to a description of decentralization and publicly provided goods in
Switzerland. We will describe both time invariant and time variant factors and their
variation across cantons.
Switzerland is a Confederation of 26 cantons. These cantons are independent from the
federal government in terms of school-level education and most aspects of the day-to-day
life in which the state is involved. These 26 Cantons are further divided into 2896 local
counties. Figure 1a and 1b show the location of the local counties and the 26 cantonal
capitals. It is notable that the topology is very inuential for the spatial distribution of
the local counties as these counties are lined up in the valleys in the south of the country
and the plains in the north. This geographic pattern suggests the importance of taking
into account factors that are specic to a canton as we will show below. Table 1 gives
for each canton the number of local counties, the average population size per county and
the average surface per local county.5 As it is apparent, the number of local counties
per canton, also referred to as fragmentation, is driven by population size. A simple
correlation between population size in a canton and the number of local counties is 0.69,
so more populous cantons have more local counties. Despite this high correlation between
population size and the number of counties there is still a large variation in the degree
of administrative decentralization. This can be measured by the average population per
local county in a canton. For instance at the end of the 1990s, there are 232 counties
in Aargau which has a total population of 539361 and thus the average population per
5The average surface is based on the total polygonal surface for each canton minus the non-prodcutive
surfaces, i.e. lakes, glaciers, rocks, etc.
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local county is 2325. There is a strong variation across cantons with Jura having 831
inhabitants per county on average and, at the other extreme Basel-City has an average
population size of 63338 per county. As the number of counties does not vary over time
we control for this by xed e¤ects for the case of education.
The factors so far refer to time invariant factors which will be captured by canton
xed e¤ects in the education regressions. We now turn to time variant measures of
decentralization. A very prominent measure of decentralization, which we will rely on
below, is the degree at which local counties are in charge of public expenditure. We
construct a commonly used measure of expenditure decentralization in year t and in




l LElct + CEct
(2.1)
where local expenditure in local county l in canton c in year t, is measured by LElct and
cantonal expenditure in a given canton and a year by CEct: When all expenditures are
carried out on the local level then Dct = 1; and when the cantonal government is solely in
charge of expenditure then Dct = 0: An issue that is raised in the literature on federalism
is the transfers across states via the federal government - or in our context between the
cantonal governments and the local counties. In Switzerland, the local counties principally
raise their own taxes to cover expenses and the transfers play, in general, a minor role in
adjusting living standards across regions. More importantly is the issue as to what this
denition of expenditure decentralization actually measures. In fact what we really want
to get at is the autonomy in terms of public policy of the local counties with respect to
the cantons. We will turn to this question in detail in the next section.
Another widely discussed factor in the determination of the degree of policy decen-
tralization is the extent of preference heterogeneity (Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf, 2002).
In this paper we take the degree of preference heterogeneity and the number of local
counties to be exogenously given. This we believe is justiable given the relatively short
time frame of the data set. This allows us to use heterogeneity, based on a measure of
linguistic fractionalization to use as an instrument for decentralization.
We focus on the education sector as it is the area of public policy where decentralization
has received most discussion in recent years (Hoxby 2000). A more important reason to
look into this sector, however, is that schooling is under the joint jurisdiction of the cantons
and the local counties who then decide the degree of delegation and decentralization to the
local counties. This means that the federal government - in contrast to cantonal and local
government - is not involved in the legislation and implementation of policies. For the
6
education sector we see in Table 1 that the average level of decentralization in Switzerland
is 0.55, that is about half of all expenditure on primary and secondary education in a
canton is spent by the local counties. Figure 2 presents a graph showing more clearly
the variation in decentralization across cantons based on their average values for 1981-
1999. Whereas Basel-City is a very centralized canton along this measure, Obwald is
almost entirely decentralized. In Figure 3 we show the variation for each cantons degree
of decentralization over time. Two facts are apparent. First there is su¢ cient variation
within each canton for meaningful xed e¤ects regressions. Second, there is no general
discernible trend towards more decentralization of centralization over time.
In summary we can see that even if the administrative structure is driven by the size
of each canton, large variations remain both across and within cantons.
3. Local autonomy in the provision of education
Although expenditure decentralization is now widely used in the empirical literature on
decentralization one can wonder what it actually measures. In fact could it not just be that
money is spent at the local level but without any form of autonomy as to what the money
is spent on? This question has been raised repeatedly when the e¤ect of decentralization
has been assessed on a cross-sectional but is also in panel data. Comparing countries along
a certain dimension - that of expenditure decentralization - raises two issues. First, is
data collected and dened identically across countries? Second, what does expenditure
decentralization actually measure?
On the rst question we have to recognize that impressive improvements have been
made in recent years to better the international comparability of data across countries.
Yet we can still question with reason if the data from countries with very di¤erent levels
of development are comparable. This is, we believe, the most compelling reason to turn
to within country data instead where we can be more certain that measurement, data
collection, storage and publication is consistent across states and coherent over time.
The second question has also been referred to as the proxy question (Hanushek et
al. 2002). It asks whether a variable can serve as a good approximation to reect a
theoretical variable or concept. This is particularly important when we want to know
when an easily observable variable is successful in capturing an underlying variation in a
variable that is more di¢ cult to measure.
In our context we took a close look at the actual legislation in Switzerland in order to
see if higher expenditure decentralization is also accompanied by more local autonomy.
Anticipating the result of this section we do nd evidence that cantons with more local
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expenditure are those that grant more autonomy to the local governments and therefore
expenditure decentralization is a powerful proxy for local autonomy.
3.1. Legal background
To assess local autonomy we will focus on the provision of education. In order to get a
detailed and precise insight into which decisions are under the responsibility of the local
governments we read through the legislation of each of the 26 cantons pertaining to the
organization of schools, the selection of teachers, and their compensation.
The Swiss education system can be concisely described by a primary school level, a
lower secondary school level, and, nally by an upper secondary school level. The rst
two school levels comprise the nine years of compulsory education. The third level, with a
duration of four to ve years, o¤ers the university entry qualication, called the maturité,
at its end.6
Many responsibilities are common across all cantons in the way they are shared be-
tween the local and the central government. Common features among all cantons are that
the primary school is the exclusive responsibility of the local communities and many as-
pects of the upper secondary school is under the jurisdiction of the cantonal government.
School material and the denition of aims, scope, and structure of school at all three
levels are regulated by cantonal, i.e. central, law. Organizational issues concerning the
day-to-day running of the schools like the allocation of pupils to classes, the enforcement
of discipline at the school, and ensuring that pupils attend class are under the competence
of the local counties. As a related point a note concerning school choice is in order. As
in most OECD countries pupils are guaranteed a place in a school within the catchment
areaof residence.7 Furthermore pupils can only attend schools of another area under
exceptional circumstances. Education is free for residents of a canton but school fees
can be levied for pupils residing outside the canton; 95% of pupils in Switzerland attend
public schools. So as such pupils and parents only have a choice of school via the choice of
residence. However unlike the US and the UK where the relative performance of schools
6There also exist professional schools that qualify students for eld-specic tertiary education but we
will abstract from those qualications.
7See for instance in Appenzell-Ausserrhoden art. 20 Schulgesetz, par 1. (Also in art 20.3 states that
when pupils from another local county attend school than nancial support can be requested from that
county to help in the nancing of those pupils; in Bern art. 7, Volksschulverordnung (VSV) 432.211; in
Freiburg art. 8, Schulgesetz and also "Gesetz ueber den Mittelschulunterricht"; in Nidwald art. 11 Volkss-
chulgesetz (312.1); in St. Gallen art.s 52 and 53 Volksschulgesetz;in Solothurn art. 45, Volksschulgesetz,
or in Schwytz art. 32 Verordnung über die Volksschulen.
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across and within areas is well documented and made public, no generalized information
of this kind exists in Switzerland. Even if it is true that parents get informed through
casual observations and discussions with other parents on their subjective evaluations,
no authoritative objective evaluation is available. We therefore do not attempt to model
specically the implications of cross-border school-choice but allow for these e¤ects to
enter through error terms that are clustered spatially for each year.8 Inspections and
auditing of schools is present in all cantonal legislation and is made operational through
external inspectors appointed by the central cantonal government.9 They are in charge
of training and evaluation of teachers, the supervision of school management, the obser-
vation of school curricula, and the use of teaching material, and the inspection of school
locations.
3.2. Variation of responsibilities across cantons
We can, however, dene four dimensions along which the level of autonomy varies across
cantons. Table 2 describes in detail the legal sources, and the division of responsibilities
and their actual form. The data sources contained therein reects those of the current
legislation as of August 2003. Where possible each legislations has been traced back to
assess if within the sample period there have been changes to these laws; but no evidence
for such changes have been found.
The purpose of this section is to see how actual legislation on local autonomy is related
to observed decentralization. As the primary school is always under local and the upper
secondary always under central jurisdiction we focus on the delegation of decisions at the
lower secondary school. Specically we identied who is in charge of:
 appointing teachers,
 determining the pay level of teachers,
 teachersincentives, and
 structural school organization.
8These issues have generated an exciting empirical literature in countries where objective measures
are available to parents. See for instance Steve Machin and Steve Gibbons (2003) where they show how
better school quality drives up property prices in England.
9For instance see the legislations of the cantons of Thurgau (art 5, 410.1 Unterrichtsgesetz, www.tg.ch),
Valais (Titre 2, Chapitre 1, 400.1 Loi sur linstruction publique, www.vs.ch), or Zug (art 67, 411.11
Schulgesetz, www.zg.ch)
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The rst point simply asks who selects and appoints teachers.10
The second dimension asks whether pay can be set at the local level. In most cantons,
teacherspay is regulated by the law on civil servants. Each teacher is allocated a pay class
(or spinal point) depending on qualication, the type of occupation, and work experience.
However in a few cantons the local counties can make additional payments to attract
teachers or can independently generate their own pay system all together.
The third dimension of local autonomy concerns the presence of incentive pay set
at the local level. Usually teachers, after being hired, are automatically promoted at
the beginning of each academic year to the next salary class (or spinal point). However
this progression can be put to halt should the performance of teachers be insu¢ cient.
Then teachers can either be kept on the same pay level or even relegated to a step
further down the salary scale. What we wanted to assess is if the decision to inict such
punishment can be made on a local county level rather than at the central level. This form
of autonomy is present in the cantons of Appenzell-Ausserrhoden, Glarus, Nidwalden, Zug
and Zurich and to a certain extent (punishment requested by local authority and granted
by cantonal government) in Basel-Landschaft. In the canton of St. Gallen teachers
can be dismissed by the local counties. Apart from "sticks" some cantons allow the
local counties to award its teachers "carrots". This can take on di¤erent forms. In
Appenzell-Ausserrhoden, local governments can spend up to 0.2% of their wage bill on
performance related pay. In Schwytz local councils can budget a specic credit - referred
to as Spontanhonorierung (spontaneous reward) - of up to 0.3% of gross total wage pay. If
this credit is granted by the legislative body, school councils can then reward teachers for
their exceptional performance. In Zug, local councils are generally also allowed to make
such bonus payments.
Of course, other forms of informal rewards and punishments can be imposed on teach-
ers both from the local and the central level. But we take the presence of such provision
as a deliberate intent by the cantons to give more autonomy to the local level of govern-
ment.11
The fourth dimension concerns local autonomy in terms of school organization. Here
we do not mean general tasks of day-to-day running of the school as they are always
10In Switzerland just as in any OECD country, vacancies in the public sector are lled by the open
tendering procedure as described in the section on public procurement.
11We also make no claims in this paper whether the presence of incentive pay as desirable or not.
Indeed as these legislation is unlikely to vary over time we these factors will be absorbed by canton xed
e¤ects. What we want to capture is if these incentive payments are determined on the local rather than
the central level.
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decided on the school or the county level. Instead we read the cantonsschool legislation
to see if local counties can in fact make important structural decisions of some kind. Here
we nd that four cantons can indeed make such choices. In two cantons the local counties
can choose between di¤erent school models (Appenzell-Ausserrhoden and Zürich). In
a further two - Solothurn and Valais - local counties can decide whether they want to
introduce an additional 10th year of education.12 Finally, the canton of Valais entitles
the local counties to decide if they want to regroup pupils from di¤erent school years for
reasons of e¤ectiveness. For these cantons we classied the dummy variables in Table 2
as "local" as we take it to be evidence that some additional local autonomy in decisions
exists.
For all these measures we refer the reader to the Table 2 for precise legal sources and
for their classication of these four dimensions of local autonomy.
3.3. Results
In Table 3 we ranked cantons in descending order in terms of their level of education
decentralization dened as the sum of local expenditures divided by all education ex-
penditure, local and central, in a canton. We than give four columns that show if a
canton allows for local autonomy in any of the four types of dimension mentioned above.
This table reveals an interesting pattern: cantons with high levels of decentralization are
more likely to have broader local autonomy. In particular one can see that cantons with
more decentralization have a higher probability to give their local counties autonomy over
teachersincentive pay. A simple cross section regression analysis - not reported - makes
this point more formally where we regress the level of decentralization on a set of dummy
variables equal to one if in a local autonomy is present. Two categories have signicant
explanatory power: autonomy over teacher appointment and on teacher incentive pay is
positively correlated with higher decentralization and over 70% of the variation in decen-
tralization across cantons can be explained by a variation in autonomy. This result is also
robust to the introduction of other control variables: cantons that are more fragmented
in the administrative divisions - as measured by the population per local county - do have
higher decentralization.
12Compulsory education is nine years after which pupils either leave school, go to professional school
or go to the Mittelschule prepearing for university. Many cantons however give pupils the option to stay
on for one more year after the ninth year without giving an additional qualication. Except for these two
cantons the presence of the 10th year is regulated by cantonal law and local counties can not choose to
introduce when it is not present or opt out of it when it is.
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We can thus conclude that autonomy is indeed related to expenditure decentralization
in this specic context. These autonomy measures are not time variant and would there-
fore be absorbed by the canton xed e¤ects that capture all time independent e¤ects of a
canton in the regressions below. This section however provided reassuring evidence that
these measures of decentralization are powerful proxies for actual local autonomy which
should enhance the credibility of the regressions of the next section.
We will nevertheless also exploit in the next section the cross-section variation to assess
if the e¤ect of decentralization is a function of the extent of autonomy.
4. Decentralization and Educational Attainment
4.1. Empirical Strategy
We now turn to an econometric estimation of the relationship between decentralization
and e¢ ciency of public good provision in the educational sector. We will approach the
estimation with a panel data set of 26 Swiss Cantons over the period 1982-2000. We
have for each canton yearly observations on decentralization and various input measures.
The advantage of looking at Swiss cantons are twofold. First data has been collected
consistently and denitions of variables are coherent across cantons over the last 20 years
which is an advantage over the studies based on international cross-sections; as docu-
mented in the previous section we have variation in the measure of decentralization and
of educational attainment across time and across cantons. Secondly, we can exploit the
panel structure and control for time-invariant and unobservable heterogeneity to account
for heterogeneity in policy preferences and topological characteristics which are important
factors in the interplay between decentralization and education.13
The objective of the estimation is to establish if decentralization is associated with
educational attainment. As the measure of educational attainment is at the year level we
need to model the total e¤ect of covariates that a¤ected a current cohort of 19 year olds
over their schooling career.
We thus estimate the e¤ect of decentralization in canton c in year t; on the educational
attainment Ect with




ct + uct: (4.1)
All variables are converted into natural logarithms. The variable Dt 1;t kct contains a
measure of the degree of decentralization that a¤ected a cohort in period t in canton c
13These have been shown to be important in the determination of district frontiers in Hoxby (2000).
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over the past k periods. This allows to capture the e¤ect a cohort experienced over their





i.e. as a moving average of the past k periods. The next section will vary k to
lter out the appropriate specication. In particular we will identify separately the e¤ect
during the whole schooling career, i.e. during the past 12 years, from the e¤ect during
the post-compulsory upper-secondary education, i.e. during the past 5 years, and during
the primary and lower secondary education period, i.e. during the rst seven years of
education.
Similarly the vector X t 1;t kct contains moving averages of the past k periods of further
control variables capturing the quality of the human resources, schooling infrastructure,
and per student expenditure. Finally c are canton and t are year xed e¤ects and
uct are unobservable disturbance terms clustered at the cantonal level to allow for serial
correlation. The precise specication will be explained and discussed below.
In order to make statements on the relationship between decentralization and e¢ ciency
of public good provision we maintain the identifying assumption on  that given the set
of other input variables it captures the e¤ect on e¢ ciency of institutional arrangements
which in this case is decentralization. Thus denote e¢ ciency by ect we assume that
ect = E(Ectjc; t; Dt 1;t kct ; X t 1;t kct ) (4.3)
where E(:j:) is the expectation operator.14
4.2. Educational Attainment
We can now turn to a central question of the paper: Is the degree of decentralization
related to higher productive e¢ ciency of government? There is a vast literature on the
economics of education that concentrates on the question as to which input measures
a¤ect educational attainment (Hanushek, 1997 and 2003). That literature has identied
a number of input measures but found very mixed results with respect to the e¤ect of
input measures on educational attainment.
First, output is mostly measured by standardized test scores. Even if we do not have
test scores available in Switzerland we have a very closely related measure namely the
14An alternative estimation strategy it to run stochastic frontier regressions. All results presented in
the following sections are robust to that estimation.
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maturité rate which is the number of students who obtain the university entrance level
qualication deated by the number of 19 year old population. Overall in Switzerland
in 2000 17% of the 19 year old population obtained the maturité which entitles them to
attend university. This level of education is four to ve years beyond the compulsory
level of education in Switzerland. Numerous studies have shown how students who obtain
this level of education have higher future income, better choice of jobs and subjective
well-being. However, not all students who continue their education at the upper sec-
ondary school level, i.e. beyond compulsory education, attend schools that provide the
maturité, but rather attend professional schools that also last four to ve years past com-
pulsory schooling. In the next section we will also address the e¤ect of decentralization
on professional school degrees but focus for the moment on maturité rates.
Second, in the education literature, the inputs are usually taken to be of two types:
school characteristics, and the social composition of a student cohort.
Table 4 presents summary statistics of all variables.15 We measure the school charac-
teristics by class size and expenditure per student.16 Second, for the social composition of
the student population we have the proportion of students whose rst language is di¤erent
to the language of instruction: on average 16% of students are not instructed in their rst
language: on average 16% of students are no instructed on their rst language. By this
we want to control for the fact that more foreign students can reduce the educational
attainment of a cohort as they may be more di¢ cult to teach due to the language barrier;
in a way we thereby capture the quality of the input.
This set of variables, together with canton and year xed e¤ects, go a long way to
characterize the structure of input variables in a given canton and year. These are of
course only a subset of variables and many other covariates contribute to the level of
educational attainment of a specic individual such as the household or the neighborhood
characteristics. However the focus of this paper is to identify the e¤ect of the level of
decentralization, which is measured at the cantonal level, and as such the identication
and the bias of that coe¢ cient is not sensitive to the omission of individual level data.
See also Hoxby (2000) for a detailed discussion of this issue.
Table 5 turns to a set of panel regressions. In the rst column we report a rst cut at
the data be regressing the educational attainment among the 19 year old population in
a year as a function of decentralization during the past 12 years, i.e. the average e¤ect
of exposure to variations in decentralization during the time this cohort spent in school.
15Variables are converted into natural logratihms and ratios are converted to ln(x+ 1).
16This number excludes expenditure for tertiary education.
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This regression is thus in the spirit of cross section regressions that ignore the problem
of omitted variable bias induced by unobserved heterogeneity. 17 As can be seen there
is a signicant negative correlation between decentralization and educational attainment.
However this can be due to many factors that are specic to a region. The importance
of this omitted variable bias is revealed when we add canton and year xed e¤ects in
column (2). Note that now the coe¢ cient is signicantly positive at the 10% level. This
illustrates that it is not innocuous to ignore the potential for unobserved heterogeneity
stemming from historical or cultural di¤erences that can be correlated with the degree of
decentralization. This can explain why in some studies using cross-section regressions a
negative correlation has been found.
In column (3) we introduce our set of control variables. Per pupil expenditure, class
size, and the share of non-native speakers are not related to educational attainment. The
coe¢ cient on educational expenditure has the expected positive sign just as larger classes
are related to lower educational attainment. When we omit the least signicant variables,
class size and foreign language speakers, we nd that expenditure per student is signicant
at the 10% level. Most notably however is that even after controlling for this last set of
variables we nd that decentralization is positively related to educational attainment at
the 10% level.
4.3. E¤ect over time
So far the right hand side variables are the moving averages of the past 12 years, i.e.
Dt 1;t 12ct and X
t 1;t 12
ct :In column 5 we identify separately the e¤ect of changes in decen-
tralization during the last 5 years of schooling, i.e. during the post-compulsory education
at the upper secondary school, from the e¤ect of changes during the rst seven years of
schooling;






ct + uct: (4.4)
We nd that it is in fact the changes in decentralization experienced during the last
ve years of education that matter. The coe¢ cient 1 is signicant at the 5% level but
2 is not signicant. The coe¢ cient on expenditure per student remains signicant at the
5% level.
Looking at column (5), our preferred specication, we see that a one-standard devia-
tion increase in decentralization, 0.147, is associated with an increase of 0.056 in decen-
tralization. In other words across all cantons, a one-standard deviation in decentralization
17See Bardhan (2002) for a review of the related empirical evidence.
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is associated with 37% of a standard deviation increase in educational attainment. This
e¤ect is quite large given that a one standard deviation increase in expenditure is only
associated with 12% of a standard deviation increase in educational attainment.18
4.4. Instrumental Variable Regression
One challenge to the established results so far is that the variation in the right hand side
variables is either endogeneous or is at least co-determined with the regressor which makes
the interpretation of the coe¢ cients di¢ cult. To address these concerns we propose to
run instrumental variable regressions to see if a case can be made for a plausibly causal
relationship between decentralization and educational attainment.
It is notoriously di¢ cult to nd an instrument in the best of cases. The challenge is
even greater here as we have a panel in which we wish to control for canton and year
specic heterogeneity which, as we showed in the last section, are important controls.
Thus we can not employ variables that vary in the cross-section only (Hoxby, 2000).
We therefore propose to use the level of urbanization in a canton as an instrument
for the degree of decentralization. Urbanization is dened as the share of population
in a canton living in urban areas which varies both across time and space. Overall in
Switzerland the level of urbanization in the sample period is 71%with a standard deviation
of 21%. The rational to use urbanization as an instrument for decentralization is the
following: When more people move into urban areas the importance and the voice of these
urban areas increases. All principal cities in Switzerland are divided into several urban
local jurisdictions which means that many of these urban districts are adjacent to each
other. Given that policies a¤ecting these districts generate important spillovers there is an
incentive to cooperation of the urban areas in the bargaining process over resources with
the central government which represents more di¤use interests. Thus we would expect
to see a positive correlation between urbanization and the degree of decentralization:
stronger urbanized cantons with concentrated interests are better placed to claim resources
and responsibilities than less urbanized cantons with more di¤use interests relative to the
central government.19
In Table 6 we show the rst and second stages of the IV regression. As can be
seen urbanization is strongly signicant in the rst stage and has a positive coe¢ cient.
18Calculated as (0:0994  0:1805)=0:151 = 0:1188
19To compare it with the case of the U.K. when London becomes more important on a national level it
strengthens the position of Ken Livingstone, the mayor of London, relative to the Prime Minister Tony
Blair.
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Furthermore the coe¢ cient on decentralization remains robust to the instrumentation and
it triples in size to 1.5. One caveat is that the sample is somewhat smaller as the data
from urbanization is only available from 1985. However, it provides strong suggestive
evidence that the reported regression results can be interpreted as a causal relationship.
4.5. Economies of Scale
It has often been argued that one crucial advantage of centralized provision of public
goods is that it can benet from economies of scale in the production process: it may be
more e¢ cient to focus the design, implementation, and maintenance of public goods in one
place rather than have several jurisdictions simultaneously engage in the same production
process. To assess if this claim holds in our context we proxy for the scope for economies
of scale by looking at the number of jurisdictions in a canton.20 The more jurisdictions
the less e¢ cient in terms of economics of scale. We thus estimate the following model:




ct  Jc) + X t 1;t 12ct + uct: (4.5)
The variable Jc measures the number of jurisdictions in a canton. Note that even though
the number of jurisdictions is time-invariant, the interaction term is identied by the cross-
sectional variation. The empirical prediction is that the interaction term is negative, i.e.
 < 0: decentralizing is more e¢ cient when there are fewer jurisdictions involved in the
process. Among the Swiss cantons the number of jurisdictions varies considerable between
3 in Basel-Stadt and 400 in Bern. Figure 4.1 below gives a kernel density of jurisdictions
across cantons. In Table 7 column (1) we report results using the same sample as in Table
5. We restrict the specication to those variables that were signicant in Table 5 column
(5). As can be seen the coe¢ cient on the interaction term is negative and signicant at
the 5% level. The coe¢ cient on decentralization 1 now increases to 0:6: This is mainly
due to the presence of the interaction term: the mean number of jurisdictions is 111 in
the data set and therefore the average e¤ect of decentralization is 0:4421. Increasing the
number of jurisdictions by 50 reduces the e¤ect of decentralization on education by 0.1.
Thus there is strong evidence that economies of scale have a strong impact in the context
of decentralization.
20An alternative measure is to use population per jurisdiction which yields qualitatively similar results
to the one presented in Table 6. Similarly the estimated e¤ect is robust to the inclusion of population
size as an additional control variable.

















0 100 200 300 400
Number of jurisdictions per canton
Figure 4.1: Kernel density of the number of jurisdictions across Swiss Cantons.
4.6. Decentralization and Autonomy
In the previous section we assessed if expenditure decentralization is a valid proxy for
autonomy. The question we now turn to is to ask if decentralizing towards more au-
tonomous regions has a di¤erent e¤ect on education than to decentralize to regions with
lower autonomy. This allows us to shed light on two questions. First, if we nd that
the e¤ect of decentralization is a function of autonomy the proxy argument of the last
section may be weak as autonomy does indeed pick up aspects that decentralization does
not. Second, there is an active debate in the institutional literature surrounding decen-
tralization if expenditure decentralization should be accompanied by increased autonomy
or not. The argument there is that decentralization can only fully develop its potential
benets when it is accompanied by more factual independence of the local jurisdictions.
To take these questions to the data we estimate the following specication:




ct  Ac) + X t 1;t 12ct + uct: (4.6)
Here Ac is a dummy variable equal to one when local decision taking is more au-
tonomous. Specically we set Ac = 1 in those cantons where teachersincentive pay is
determined at the local rather than at the central level, it is equal to Ac = 0:5 when
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the decision is taken at both levels, and Ac = 0 when the decision is taken centrally.22
Of the 26 cantons in twelve the decision is taken locally, in four cantons the decision is
taken jointly by the central and local authorities, and the remaining ten implement per-
formance related pay at the centre. Note again that even though the autonomy measure
is time-invariant, the interaction term is identied by the cross-sectional variation.
In column (2) of Table 7 we present regression results with the added interaction term.
The coe¢ cient on the interaction term is not signicant.23
This results seems to suggest that the proxy assessment in the previous section is valid.
It also suggests that, at least for this context and for the variables employed, we nd no
evidence that combining expenditure decentralization with autonomy has an additional
e¤ect on the outcome. To assess this interpretations further would require to have more
dimensions along which autonomy varies across regions in order to lter out which type
of autonomy matters - which is beyond the scope of this data set.
4.7. Decentralization and Budgetary Competence
A further criticism of decentralization is that the competence of local politicians standing
for election may be lower than those standing for positions in the central government. This
may be due to the fact the holding an o¢ ce at the local government is less prestigious
than at the central government. These issues can be particularly acute in the context of
developing countries, as discussed in Bardhan (2002), where the competence of local public
o¢ cials is often very low. To assess this second argument we follow the methodology in
Galiani and Schargrodsky (2001). In that paper, competence of a government is proxied
by the size of the budgetary surplus. Low or negative surplus, i.e. decit, is interpreted to
be associated with less competent governments. In contrast to Galiani and Schargrodsky
(2001) we have data not only on the level of budgetary surplus at the central but also at
the local level. To assess the e¤ect of decentralization jointly with the level of competence





ct SLct)+C(Dt 1;t 5ct SCct)+X t 1;t 12ct +uct (4.7)
Here SLct measures the budgetary surplus of all local governments in a canton as a
percent of cantonal GDP; SCct measures the budgetary surplus of the central government
22We focus on this measure as the other measures exhibit little variation across cantons.
23In the specication reported in Table 6 we also keep the interaction term with local jurisdictions which
has been found to be an important variable to avoid misspecication. Even if we drop that variable, the
coe¢ cient  remains insignicant.
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as a percent of cantonal GDP. Thus L measures the e¤ect of decentralizing towards local
governments with a relatively high level of competence and C measures the e¤ect of
decentralizing away from a central government with a relatively high level of competence.
In column (3) of Table 7 we see that L > 0 and C < 0 but only the coe¢ cient on L
is signicant. This is evidence that decentralizing towards a region that has a high level of
budgetary competence translates into more gains, i.e. L > 0; in educational attainment
than in regions with lower competence. Equally, decentralizing away from a competent
central government, as C < 0; reduces the gains from expenditure decentralization.
This result gives support to the notion that competence - even in a developed coun-
try like Switzerland - needs to be taken into account in the decision over the degree of
decentralization.
4.8. Adverse e¤ects of decentralization
So far we have found evidence that decentralization is associated with better educational
attainment as measured by maturité rates. It is important, however, to test if these gains
were accompanied by losses along other dimensions. We focus on two types of adverse
e¤ects.
First, we ask is these gains in educational attainment are gender specic, i.e. if the
gains to one gender has been accompanied by losses for the other. There are various
reasons why decentralization leads to more targeted outcomes. If decentralization is in-
creasing responsiveness to the median voter in each region then the preferences of this
voter will change the policy choice. Central governments on the other hand are argued
to be more able to redistribute gains to minority interests that are less well represented
at the local level. Figure 4.2 presents educational attainment by gender - as measured by
the maturité rate - across all Swiss cantons in the sample period. In the case of Switzer-
land, there are now more women than men obtaining this degree as a share of 19 year old
female and male population respectively. Table 8 presents panel regressions where now
the dependent variable is the maturité rate among women in column (1) and the maturité
rate among men in column (2).24 For the case of female educational attainment, decen-
tralization has a positive e¤ect but it is not statistically signicant. Only expenditure
is signicantly related to the female maturité rate. In column (2) we repeat the same
exercise but now for male students only. Here decentralization has a strong and signif-
icant e¤ect on men; equally the economy of scale a¤ect and the budgetary competence
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Figure 4.2: Maturité rate among women and men in Switzerland as a share of 19 year
old female and male population.
e¤ect only comes into play for male students but not for female students. Given that the
gains have accrued more to men than to women we also estimated a gender education gap
model - not reported - where the dependent variables were
gapit = E
female
it   Emaleit (4.8)
jgapitj =
Efemaleit   Emaleit  (4.9)
We do not, however, nd25 that decentralization signicantly increased the gender gap
in education neither in relative nor in absolute terms.
Second, we assess if the gains in terms of maturité rates has been accompanied by a
decline at other degrees. Among post-compulsory education the modal group of students
attends professional schools rather than maturité schools. For instance in 2000 17% of 19
year old students obtained the maturité but 57% obtained a degree from a professional
school. In column (3) of Table 8 we estimate a model where the dependent variable is
the share of 19 year olds that obtain a degree from a professional school. We nd that
decentralization had no e¤ect on that level of education.
25Results are available from the authors.
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In summary, we nd no evidence for adverse e¤ects of decentralization. More local
expenditure is associated with better education among men but that has not been to the
detriment of education among women nor did it signicantly a¤ect the gender gap in
education. Similarly other degrees like those obtained from professional schools are not
related to decentralization. Therefore is seems that decentralization is associated with a
net gain in terms of educational attainment.
4.9. Party competition
So far the empirical strategy did not take into account the political environment which
could also have a bearing on the e¢ ciency of public good provision. A central argument
in the political economy literature is that the advantage of democracies is that through
the competitive pressure between parties, governments have an incentive to exert more
e¤ort when in o¢ ce when they are under threat to be replaced by a challenger. To control







where sIit is the number of seats in parliament of the incumbent party and s
C
ct is the
number of seats in parliament by the challenger. The idea is that the when PCit is close
to zero, competition is very erce for reelection which gives the incumbent party stronger
incentives to perform while in power. When PCit is positive and large, competitive
pressure is weak.
We implement this measure by proxying sIit by the seat share of the largest party in a
cantonal parliament and sCit by the seat share of the second largest party in government.
We then estimated;




ct  PCct) + PCct + X t 1;t 12ct + uct (4.11)
The prediction would be that   0 but   0: Party competition a¤ects outcome
directly and decentralizing away from a competitive central government is thus reducing
educational attainment. Regression results - not reported - using these additional control
variables showed that neither the coe¢ cient on party competition  nor on the interaction
term  is signicantly di¤erent from zero and the coe¢ cient on decentralization  is
una¤ected.
26No comprehensive data is available on the party composition of the local governments.
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This results also sheds some light, even if indirect, on the discussion whether decentral-
ization increases matching of policy to preferences. In our case this can not be reconciled
with the data as then we should have found that party competition at the centre diminish
e¢ ciency gains from decentralization.
5. Conclusions
We investigated the empirical evidence on the relationship between decentralization and
e¢ ciency of public good provision. As a rst step we looked at the current legislation in
the Swiss cantons to provide careful evidence on the positive relation between expenditure
decentralization and local autonomy in decision. We then proceed to panel regressions
of data from Swiss cantons for the last 20 years. We saw that even after controlling for
other input variables the degree of decentralization is positively related to educational
attainment. We take this to be novel and consistent evidence that contradicts earlier
cross-section ndings that decentralization worsens governance (Treisman, 2002). Indeed
it is the quality of data and the correct specication of the model that helps to uncover
the precise e¤ect of decentralization on the e¢ ciency of public good provision.
We also nd evidence that expenditure decentralization and local autonomy are sub-
stitutes rather than complements and that expenditure decentralization is more benecial
when local governments are more competent or, equally, when central governments are
less competent.
These results shed new light on the empirical relevance of decentralization and the
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Figure 1a: Switzerland
Figure 1b: The location of local counties and cantonal capitals in Switzerland
Local
Central
Table 1: Number of local counties and other characteristics by canton.
Aargau 232 539 2325 5.91 0.37
Appenzell-Ausserrhoden 20 54 2688 11.98 0.78
Appenzell-Innerrhoden 6 15 2488 26.35 0.73
Basel-Stadt 3 190 63338 11.79 0.01
Basel-Landschaft 86 258 2996 5.98 0.63
Bern 400 942 2356 12.02 0.48
Fribourg 242 233 965 6.30 0.50
Genève 45 402 8938 5.37 0.15
Glarus 29 39 1334 14.95 0.68
Graubünden 212 186 878 19.55 0.76
Jura 83 69 831 10.02 0.45
Luzern 107 345 3224 13.01 0.71
Neuchâtel 62 166 2672 11.46 0.66
Nidwald 11 38 3416 18.97 0.89
Obwald 7 32 4586 56.99 0.93
Schaffhausen 34 74 2165 8.67 0.66
Schwytz 30 128 4250 24.22 0.79
Solothurn 126 243 1931 6.22 0.75
St. Gallen 90 447 4963 19.63 0.81
Ticino 245 308 1257 7.84 0.44
Thurgau 80 227 2832 10.64 0.77
Uri 20 36 1776 23.88 0.67
Vaud 384 615 1601 6.99 0.45
Valais 160 275 1719 15.07 0.40
Zug 11 97 8834 18.38 0.74
Zürich 171 1196 6996 9.53 0.64




Degree of education 
expenditure 
decentralization**





Average surface in 
km2 per county*
Notes: Decentralization is defined as the ration between the sum of all local expenditure in a canton and the sum of all local plus cantonal expenditures. * Based on total 
surface per canton minus non-producutive surface (lakes, rock, glaciers). The population data is based on an average between 1997 and 2001.  **  calculated for average 
education exependiture between 1981 and 1999. ***Average decentralization rate for 1982 to 1999 defined as the sum of all local expenditures across cantons on public 
education as a share of all expenditure by local and cantonal governments across cantons. The unweighted average across cantons is 0.61.
Figure 2: Education Expenditure Decentralization in Swiss Cantons. 



































































































































































































































































Table 2: Legal Sources on the local autonomy of schools in Swiss cantons as of 2003
Canton Code legal sources Teacher appointment Teacher Salary Teacher Incentives Structural School 
Organisation
Aargau AG http://www.ag.ch/sar/ local central central central
401.100 Schulgesetz art 42, Schulgesetz art 66 Schulgesetz Schulgesetz
AI http://www.ai.ch/_d/lexdb/index.shtml local central local central
401.100 Schulgesetz art 42, Schulgesetz art 36, Schulgesetz art 44, 53b, 54; 401.1 401.1
AR www.ar.ch local central local: local




Bern BE http://www.sta.be.ch/belex local central central central
432.210 Volkschulgesetz (VSG) art 7, 430.250 430.25 art 12, 432.210
432.211 Volksschulverordnung (VSV)
430.250 Gesetz über die Anstellung 
der Lehrkräfte (LAG)
BL http://www.baselland.ch/ local central partially local central: 
art 49 SGS 642.11 art 24, SGS 640
(by Schulpflege)
SGS 640 Bildungsgesetz 
Basel-Stadt BS http://www.gesetzessammlung.bs.ch partially local central central central 




local suggestion but 
decision central in 
particular if suggestion 
split in local authority.






A local authority can spend up to 
0.2% of their wage bill on bonus. 
Teachers can also remain on the 
same pay level or can be 
relegated to a lower pay level in 
case of unsatisfactory work.
except for reprimands: art 21 par. 
i, 432.211
Local administration can request 
further disciplinary measures 
going beyond formal reprimands: 




Canton Code legal sources Teacher appointment Teacher Salary Teacher Incentives Structural School 
Organisation
Fribourg FR http://www.fr.ch local central central central 
art 45; 411.0.1 122.72.21 122.72.1 art 26 to 29; 411.0.1
411.0.1 Schulgesetz
411.0.11 Schulverordnung
Genève GE http://www.ge.ch central central central central
C 1 10: Loi sur l'instruction publique by the Conseil d'Etat C 1 10 art 130, C 1 10 C 1 10
art 122, C 1 10
Glarus GL http://www.gl.ch/gesetzessammlung/ local central: local central
IV B/1/3 Bildungsgesetz art 64, IV B/1/3 art 74, IV B 1/3 art 67, IV B 1/3 art 12-40; IV B/1/3
(Schulbehörde)
Graubünden GR www.gr.ch local: central: local: central: 
421.000 (Schulgesetz) art 34; 421.000 art 35; 421.000 art 5; 421.080  421.000
170.400 (Personalverordnung, PV) art 14 par 4; 170.400
421.080 Lehrerbesoldungsverordnung
Jura JU www.ju.ch local: central (strict!): central central
410.11 Loi scolaire art 87; 410.11 art 96; 410.11 art 95; 410.11 410.11
art 30,31; 173.11
122.72.1 Gesetz über die 
Besoldungen des Staatspersonals
122.72.21 Beschluss über die 
Einreihung der Funktionen des 
Staatspersonals
Pay increases on average by one 
step on pay scale per year but 
local authority can, depending on 
performance, award between 
zero and two steps.
173.11 Loi sur le statut des 
magistrats, fonctionnaires et 
employés de la République et 
Canton du Jura
Table 2 (continued)
Canton Code legal sources Teacher appointment Teacher Salary Teacher Incentives Structural School 
Organisation
Luzern LU http://www.lu.ch local: central/part local local central: 
art 47; SRL 400.a art 29; SRL 400.a art 48 GVSB, SRL 400.a
Neuchâtel NE www.ne.ch local: central part local central
art 32; 410.10 152.510 410.10
art 14; 410.23 152.511
(requires approval from central 
government):  rewards for 
exceptional service art 61; 
152.510 and art 36; 152.511
RSN 410.10: Loi sur l'organisation 
scolaire
RSN 410.23: Loi concernant les 
autorités scolaires
RSN 152.510: Loi sur le statut de la 
fonction publique
RSN 152.511: Règlement général 
d'application de la loi sur le statut de 
la fonction publique
art 11; SRL075: up to 25% of 
salary increase to keep a teacher 
with exceptional qualification.
art 8 par 3; SRL075: if a teacher 
does not fulfill requirments than 
her pay can remain on the same 
level (instead of automatic 
increase to the next level)
art 11; SRL 075 
stipulates that up to 
25% of salary can be 




SRL 400.a: Gesetz über die 
Volksschulbildung (GVSB)
SRL051: Gesetz über das öffentlich-
rechtliche Arbeitsverhältnis 
(Personalgesetz)
SRL075: Besoldungsverordnung für 
die Lehrpersonen und die 
Fachpersonen der schulischen 
Dienste
art 35; SRL400.a: up to 25% of 
salary can be given as a reward 
for extraordinary performance.
Table 2 (continued)
Canton Code legal sources Teacher appointment Teacher Salary Teacher Incentives Structural School 
Organisation
Nidwald NW local partially local local central
art 20; 311.1 art 21; 311.1 art 11 par 2; 311.112, 311.1
311.1 Bildungsgesetz
312.1 Volksschulgesetz
Obwald OW www.ow.ch local: central local: central 




St. Gallen SG www.gallex.ch local central part local central
SGS 213.1 Volkschulgesetz art 114; 213.1 SGS 213.51 213.1
Schaffhausen SH www.sh.ch local central central central 
SHR 410.1 Schulgesetz art 57; 410.1 art. 9 and 41; 180.100 410.1
SHR 180.100 Personalgesetz
SHR 180.110 Besoldungsdekret
SGS 213.51 Gesetz über die 
Besoldung derVolksschullehrer
410.1 Gesetz über Schule und 
Bildung (Schulgesetz)
141.111 Ausführungsbestimmungen 
über die Stellenbewertung und 
Entlöhnung
local for end of contract, art 72; 
213.1. central for stop of salary 
increase art 82, 86; 213.1 
311.112 Vereinbarung über die 
Entlöhnung der Lehrpersonen der 
Gemeindeschulen 
(Entlöhnungsvereinbarung)




scheme by majority 
rule which has to be 
approved by central 
government. Central 
government can then 
implement scheme in 
all counties if a 
majority of counties 
approve of it.
Punishments for insufficient 
performance leading to pay 
remaining on the same pay level 
or relegation to a lower level.  
Performance related pay of up to 
60% above base.





art 7; 312.1 quality audit; in case 
of changes local 
recommendations are to be taken 
into account whenever possible
Table 2 (continued)
Canton Code legal sources Teacher appointment Teacher Salary Teacher Incentives Structural School 
Organisation
Solothurn SO www.so.ch local central central: local: 
413.111 Volksschulgesetz (VSG)
126.515.851.1 Lehrerbesoldungsgesetz
Schwytz SZ www.sz.ch local central local central
611.210 Verordnung ü.d. Volksschuleart 5; 612.110 612.110 611.210
Thurgau TG www.tg.ch part central: central: local central 
410.1 Unterrichtsgesetz 177.250 410.1
177.22 Besoldungsverordnung
Ticino TI www.ti.ch local central central central
5.1.6.1.1: R della scuola media art 2 par b; 2.5.4.1. 2.5.4.1. 5.1.6.1.1 and art 34; 2.5.4.1 5.1.1.1
5.1.1.1: L della scuola 
Uri UR http://www.ur.ch/rechtsbuch/start.htm local part local local: central 
10.1111 Schulgesetz art 59; 10.1111 10.1111
2.4211 Personalverordnung




the framwork of 
cantonal law.
2.5.4.1 Legge sull' ordinamento degli 
impiegati dello Stato e dei docenti
a) pay increase is based on 
satisfactory performance: art 40 
par 4; 2.4211. 
b)  concerning bonus payment for 
excellence in performance art 41 
and 42; 2.4211
up to 5% wage reduction for poor 
performance art 12; 177.22, but 
strictly no additional payments by 
local authorities art 6, (177.250)
177.250 Verordnung des Grossen 
Rates ü.d. Besoldung der Lehrkräfte
612.110 Personal- und Besoldungs-
verordnung für die Lehrpersonen an 
der Volksschule
art 54; 410.1 
(nominated locally but 
approved centrally)
art 41; 612.110: school council 
can allocate up to 0.3% of total 
wage bill to bonus payments for 
exceptional performance.
art 21, par 2; 
413.111: local 
counties can 
introduce an optional 




art 53; 413.111 and art 
5; 413.121.1
art 12; 413.121.1 and 
art ; 126.515.851.1
art 4 par. 2 in 126.515.851.11 art 
4 par 2
Table 2 (continued)
Canton Code legal sources Teacher appointment Teacher Salary Teacher Incentives Structural School 
Organisation
Vaud VD www.vd.ch local central central central
RSV 4.2.A Loi Scolaire art. 79, 4.2.A RSV 1.6 art 27; RSV 1.6 4.2.A
Valais VS www.vs.ch local central central local 
400.1 Loi sur l'instruction publique art 75; 400.1 art 98, 400.1 art 50; 400.1
Zug ZG www.zg.ch local local local central 
412.11 Schulgesetz art 61; 412.11 art 65; 412.11
412.31 Lehrerbesoldungsgesetz
154.21 Personalgesetz
Zürich ZH www.zhlex.ch local central local local




RSV 1.6. A Loi sur le personnel de 
l'Etat de Vaud (LPers)
405.3 Loi concernant le traitement 
du personnel enseignant des écoles 
primaires, du cycle d'orientation et 
des écoles secondaires du 
deuxième degré.
art 6 abs 7, 9, 12; 412.31. art 74 
abs 1 lit c 154.21: Bonus for 
exceptional performance and 
valuable proposals.
Increase in teachers pay based 
on "good" evaluation score.
Local counties can 
choose between two 
school models for 
lower secondary 
school.
a) Pupils of different 
school years can be 
regrouped into one 
class for 
effectiveness. b) 
Local counties can 
introduce an optional 
tenth school year.
art 6, abs. 9-11; 
412.31 to attract 
teachers, pay can be 
increased by up to 
25%.
Table 3:  Cantons ranked by level of education decentralization and their scope of local autonomy
Obwald 0.93 x x
Nidwald 0.89 x (x) x
St. Gallen 0.81 x (x)
Schwytz 0.79 x x
Appenzell-Ausserrhoden 0.78 x x x
Thurgau 0.77 (x) x
Graubünden 0.76 x x
Solothurn 0.75 x x
Zug 0.74 x x x
Appenzell-Innerrhoden 0.73 x x
Luzern 0.71 x (x) x
Glarus 0.68 x x
Uri 0.67 x (x) x
Neuchâtel 0.66 x (x)
Schaffhausen 0.66 x
Zürich 0.64 x x x











Note: Education decentralization is defined as the sum of all local expenditure devided by cantonal expenditure plus the sum of all local dependiture in a canton. x: the decision is taken at the local 
and not at the central level. (x): decision is shared between local and central government. * Local authorities take the decision about performance related pay (pay level increment, bonus). ** Local 











Table 4  –  Summary Statistics
All data is converted to natural logarithm*  
The Date covers  26 Swiss Cantons during 1982-2000 
Standard errors in parentheses
Performance Measure for Public Education
Maturité rate (in logs) .151
share of 19 year population with University entry level qualification (.048)
Female Maturité rate as a share of 19 year old women  (in logs) .151
(.062)
Male Maturité rate as a share of 19 year old men  (in logs) .149
(.040)
Professional School Degrees as a share of 19 year old population  (in logs) .462
(.087)
Decentralization
Share of local expenditure to all expenditure (local and central, in logs) .466
5 year moving average (.147)
Control Variables 
Education expenditure per pupil** (12 year moving average, in logs) 2.712
at all levels of government in 1990 Swiss Francs (.1805)
Class size in schools (12 year moving average, in logs) 3.478
(.1045)
Non-native speakers (12 year moving average, in logs) 2.672
percent of students whose first language is not the language of instruction (.5000)
Budget surplus as a percent of cantonal GDP (5 year moving average, in logs)
  -at the central (cantonal) government level -.0007825
(.0009249)
  -at the local government level -.0003655
(.0003825)
Number of local jurisdictions in a canton 111.38
(111.74)
Notes: Source is Swiss Federal Statistical Office (various departments); http://www.statistik.admin.ch  *All data converted 
to natural logarithms unless for proportions when converted to log(x+1). *primary and secondary education excluding 
tertiary education.
Table 5 – Decentralization and Educational Attainment in Swiss Cantons
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses, allowing for clustering at canton level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Decentralization -0.2146*** 0.3767* 0.4085* 0.4123*
average of past 12 years (.0607) (.2185) (.2323) (.2133)
Decentralization 0.3749**
average of past 5 years (.1740)
Decentralization 0.0811
average of 6 to 12 years lagged (.1003)
Expenditure per pupil 0.0842 0.0937* 0.0994**
average of past 12 years (.0537) (.0483) (.0450)
Class size in upper secondary school -0.0288
average of past 12 years (.0580)
Non-native speakers 0.0105
average of past 12 years (.0236)
Canton fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Errors clustered at canton level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.4246 0.9516 0.9539 0.9536 0.9544
Number of observations 208 208 208 208 208
Dependent variable = Share of 19 year old population obtaining university entry qualification (Maturité rate)
Base 
regression








Notes: * significant at 10% level,  ** at 5% level, *** at 1% level. See Table 4 for definition of variables. Right hand side variables in column (1)-(4) 
are average values of past 12 years. In column 5 decentralization is split into average of past 5 years - proxying for the period during upper 
secondary school - and 6 to 12 years in the past - proxying for the period during primary and lower secondary school.
Table 6 – Instrumental Variable Regression
First stage regression Dependent variable = Decentralization rate
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses, allowing for clustering at canton level
Urbanization 0.5269***
average of past 5 years (0.1613)
Expenditure per pupil 0.0093
average of past 12 years (0.01913)
Canton fixed effects Yes
Year fixed effects Yes
Errors clustered at canton level Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.9988
Number of observations 176
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses, allowing for clustering at canton level
Decentralization 1.5644**
average of past 5 years (0.6178)
Expenditure per pupil 0.1426**
average of past 12 years (0.0548)
Canton fixed effects Yes
Year fixed effects Yes
Errors clustered at canton level Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.9434
Number of observations 176
Second stage regression Dependent variable = Maturité rate
Notes: * significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level, *** at 1% level. Urbanization is the log of the share of the population in a 
canton living in urban areas.
Table 7 – Decentralization, Economies of Scale, Local Autonomy, and Budgetary Competence
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses, allowing for clustering at canton level
(1) (2) (3)
Decentralization 0.6619** 1.164** 0.6554**
average of past 5 years (.2547) (.5566) (.2705)
Decentralization x Number of local jurisdictions -0.00199** -0.0035** -0.00180*
average of past 5 years (.00088) (.00172) (.0010)
Decentralization x Dummy =1 when teacher incentives -0.6345
decided at local level (0.5147)
average of past 5 years
Decentralization x Budget Surplus at the local level 15.827*
average of past 5 years (9.058)
Decentralization x Budget Surplus at the cantonal level -.4589
average of past 5 years (4.235)
Expenditure per pupil 0.1080** 0.1022** 0.0993**
average of past 12 years (.0427) (.0425) (.0424)
Canton fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Errors clustered at canton level Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.9554 0.9561 0.9564
Number of observations 208 208 208







Notes: * significant at 10% level,  ** at 5% level, *** at 1% levell. See Table 4 for definition of variables. Right hand side variables in column (1)-(4) are 
average values of past 12 years. In column 5 decentralization is split into average of past 5 years - proxying for the period during upper secondary 
school - and 6 to 12 years in the past - proxying for the period during primary and lower secondary school.
Table 8 – Any Adverse Effects of Decentralization?
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses, allowing for clustering at canton level
(1) (2) (3)
Decentralization 0.6806 0.8325*** -1.061
average of past 5 years (.4975) (.2911) (1.064)
Decentralization x Number of local jurisdictions -0.0017 -0.0026* 0.0045
average of past 5 years (.1935) (.0015) (.0047)
Decentralization x Budget Surplus at the local level 0.1935 38.874** -43.442
average of past 5 years (12.652) (16.582) (104.28)
Decentralization x Budget Surplus at the cantonal level -1.2598 -8.789 52.53**
average of past 5 years (5.4159) (7.295) (25.084)
Expenditure per pupil 0.1778** -0.0075 -.1248
average of past 12 years (.0656) (.0869) (.3957)
Canton fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Errors clustered at canton level Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.9483 0.9561 0.7313













Notes: * significant at 10% level,  ** at 5% level, *** at 1% level. See Table 4 for definition of variables. The dependent variables are: in column (1) the number 
of women obtaining the maturite degree as a share of 19 year old women; in column (2)  the number of men obtaining the maturite degree as a share of 19 
year old men; in column (3) the number of students obtaining the professional school degree as a share of 19 year old population.
